Introduction
Different approaches exist to explaining cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game.
With perfectly rational agents cooperation is an equilibrium outcome if the chance that the game is repeated another time is sufficiently large. With boundedly rational agents in evolutionary game theory, cooperation may emerge if the interaction between agents is non-uniform, i.e., the chance that cooperative types meet each other is higher than the chance that they meet defective types. One such a case is when interaction is between siblings (see, e.g., Bergstrom and Stark, 1993) . Another is when interaction is only between neighbors as in Eshel, Shaked and Samuelson (1998) . It is commonly thought in both approaches that due to increasing anonymity cooperation is less likely to be observed in large populations than in smaller ones. In this paper I present a dynamic model that tell us that this is not necessarily so.
I consider the interaction between members of two different populations. The two populations have lived in isolation of each other and for reasons not analysed here, one population has evolved in the past towards cooperative behavior and the other towards defective behavior. Now that I see an increase in the interaction between different societies, I want to study the question whether the interaction between members of the two populations results in one type of behavior driving out the other or in the two types of behavior coexisting next to each other. This type of analysis has been done for coordination games in Goyal and Janssen (1997) .
In the model each individual agent interacts with anyone in the population, but more so with their neighbors. Given some population configuration each individual receives a certain pay-off.
The pay-off is a weighted average of the pay-offs under strict uniform and local interaction. The implications of two types of imitation dynamics are examined. Under Imitating the Best Agent (IBA), each agent observes the pay-off of each individual in the neighborhood and individuals imitate the agent who has received the highest pay-off in the previous period. Under imitating the best behavior (cooperation or defection), each agent only observes the average pay-off of cooperators and defectors in the neighborhood and they imitate the action that has yielded the highest average pay-off in the neighborhood (IBB). I will look at the development of the number of cooperative agents over time by investigating the behavior of the boundary between the two populations.
Roughly speaking, our main result is that for a wide range of parameter values and for any of the above mentioned dynamic processes there exists a threshold value (depending on the parameter values) of the population size: if the population size is larger than this threshold value cooperation will emerge, if on the other hand the population size is smaller than the threshold value cooperation will vanish. (For some other parameter values coexistence of the behaviors of the two populations is possible). The intuition for the main result can be grasped by comparing the pay-off of a cooperative type who is surrounded by other cooperative agents and the pay-off of a defective type who is surrounded by other defective agents. What matters in both classes of dynamic processes is not the absolute value of the pay-off, but the pay-off of a certain type relative to the pay-offs of others (cf., Vega-Redondo, 1997). The total pay-off difference between the cooperative and the defective type under consideration can be decomposed in a pay-off difference due to local interaction and a pay-off difference due to uniform interaction.
The pay-off difference due to local interaction is independent of the size of the population and positive, i.e., the cooperative type receives a larger pay-off out of local interaction than the defective type. The pay-off difference due to uniform interaction itself can be decomposed into two parts. A first part is due to the fact that in a match with a given agent of the population, the defective type always receives a higher pay-off than the cooperative type. This part is also independent of the size of the population. A second part is due to the fact that under uniform interaction, a cooperative type meets relatively more defective agents than the defective agents themselves do. This is because a given agent will be matched with one of the other agents in the population.
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This second part also favors the defective agents, but this part of the uniform interaction effect vanishes as the population size becomes large. Given the observations above it is then relatively easy to see that the uniform interaction effect may dominate the local interaction effect for small populations, whereas the reverse may hold true for large populations.
From the above it becomes clear that what is important for the result is (i) the presence of some neighborhood effect and (ii) some form of non-best reply dynamics. If interactions were uniform in the population, each agent will roughly meet the same agents as the others and in such a world, defection always yields a higher pay-off (as it is the dominant strategy). Also, over time best reply dynamics will result in defection as for any given behavior of a set of opponents, 1 The fact that under uniform interaction you do not play a game with yourself is also used in a different context by Huck and Oechsler (1995). defect is always the best reply. On the other hand, for the general idea of the results to hold, it is not so important whether pay-off comparisons are made locally or globally. In this paper I mainly focus on imitative behavior in which the pay-off comparisons are within the neighborhood.
There is a large and rapidly growing literature in evolutionary game theory explaining the emergence of cooperative behavior in populations. I provide a sketchy overview of some of the main results. Two branches can be distinguished: a large part of the literature considers the evolution of behavior in a repeated version of the prisoner's dilemma; a smaller part considers the one shot game. The literature on the repeated PD game started with investigations by Axelrod (1984) and Maynard Smith (1982) . More recently, Nowak (1992, 1993 ) study how cooperation may emerge when agents interact in two-dimensional spatial structures. They use computer simulations showing that depending on the interaction structure complex patterns of cooperative and defective behavior may persist. Ashlock, Stanley and Tesfatsion (1994) allow players to choose their opponents in such a way that the interaction structure emerges endogenously. The evolution of cooperation in finitely and infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games has also been studied by Bicchieri (1990) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Nachbar (1992) , among others. The main difference with the present paper is that I focus on the dynamics of cooperative behavior when each game is played as a one shot game.
Evolution of cooperation in one shot games has been studied by Bergstrom (1995), Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and Frank (1987) , among others. What makes cooperation a feasible outcome in Frank's model is that before they play the game agents observe a noisy signal which informs them about the type of behavior to be expected from the opponent. This signal is supposed to be encoded in someone's genes. Players can make their one shot strategy conditional upon the observed signal. Bergstrom (1995) and Bergstrom and Stark (1993) also regard genes as the determinants of behavior and the object of selection. In their models, children inherit their genetical make-up from their parents. Cooperation emerges in their papers, because the prisoner's dilemma game is (mainly) played between siblings and as siblings have similar genes cooperative genes may do better than defective ones. The local interaction aspect of our model is the counterpart of the interaction between siblings in the papers by Bergstrom and Stark. Our paper is, however, closer in spirit to the main body of papers in evolutionary game theory in economics in the sense that the fundamental object on which the evolutionary or imitation process works is a strategy and not genes.
The paper closest to ours is Eshel et al. (1998) . They show that under IBB with strict local interaction within a small neighborhood the majority of agents in a population will display cooperative behavior. There are a few differences between their paper and the present one. The present paper is simpler as at any point in time, there is one group of cooperators and one group of defectors. This is convenient as the dynamic process can be investigated by looking at the boundary between regions. Drawback of this assumption is that we can not allow for the possibility of mutants entering the population. On the other hand, the present paper is more general as different types of imitative behavior are considered and as a combination of local and uniform interaction is studied.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model that is used. Section 3 presents the results under imitating the best behavior dynamics and Section 4 briefly discusses the imitating the best agent dynamics. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
2.
The Models 
where U i is the average pay-off of the individual agent on location i, α is the relative weight of local interaction in the average pay-off of individual i, u i (i,j) is the pay-off of individual i when interacting with individual j and N is the size of the population. Equation (1) allows for two interpretations. First, one may consider a situation in which each individual meets only one other agent in the population in a certain period. The parameter α can then be interpreted as the probability that the individual will meet someone out of his neighborhood (and within this neighborhood, he will meet someone at random). In this interpretation, U i is the expected pay-off of individual i and I have to allow agents to observe the expected pay-off of other agents (in the neighborhood) to retain a determinstic dynamics. A second and more favored interpretation is one in which agents meet everyone in the population, but meet neighbors more frequently than others. In this interpretation α measures the relative importance of local interaction for the average pay-off of an individual. Note that α is assumed to be independent of the population size. 
where the number of cooperative (defective) agents is denoted by x (N-x). A few observations with respect to these pay-offs can be made. Obviously, the average pay-off of the '+' categories of each type is larger than the average pay-off of the '0' category and this in turn is larger than the average pay-off of the '-' category. Also, the average pay-off of the D According to the second dynamics, agents only observe the average pay-off of cooperative and defective behaviors in their neighborhood and choose, in the next period, the behavior that has yielded the highest pay-off in this period.
Imitating the Best Behavior
In this section I consider a dynamic process based on "imitating the best behavior in your neighborhood" (IBB), where the best behavior is defined as the behavior (cooperative 
is the average pay-off of cooperators, respectively, defectors in the neighborhood of the D 0 individual. From these expressions it follows that in the special case
Similarly, the average pay-off of the cooperators, resp. defectors in the neighborhood of the Hence, when condition (3) is satisfied, the D 0 individuals will switch to cooperation and, as the above argument is independent of time and the number of cooperators in the population, cooperation will be the most observed behavior in the long run. In the context of proposition 2 and 3 it is shown in the appendix that the population will either have two defectors or will cycle between one and three defectors in the long run. On the other hand, when condition (3) is violated it is clear that
so that defection will prevail in the long run.
Condition (3) also reveals that for cooperation to emerge in the long run N has to be larger than a certain cut-off value, which depends on the pay-off parameters and the value of α. This result is formally stated in proposition 1 and graphically illustrated in figure 1. These variables are defined as follows:
Proposition 1. Suppose (a-c) = (b-d) and x 0 = 2. There is a time period T such that for all t >, T,
The parameter * 1
x , resp. , 
if the conditions under (i) and (ii) are not satisfied,
Proposition 3. Suppose (a-c) < (b-d) and x 0 > 2. There is a time period T such that
(iii) if the conditions under (i) and (ii) are not satisfied,
Two elements of the stated propositions deserve some further explanation. First, the initial number of cooperators, x 0 has to be larger than or equal to 2 in order for cooperation to have any chance of surviving. Second, the first part of both Propositions should be read as follows:
depending on the initial number of defectors (whether it is odd or even) either the population converges to everyone cooperating in the long run or the population converges to a two-period cycle in which the number of defective agents alternates between 1 and 3.
Imitating the best Agent
I have argued in Section 3 that when local interaction is confined to meeting one individual on either side, then at the boundary the individual who defects receives a higher pay-off than the one (at the other side of the boundary) who cooperates. This implies that under IBA with local interaction in a neighborhood of two, the defective agent will keep on playing defect. On the other hand, the cooperative agent at the boundary may ( The pay-offs of the four individuals is respectively:
Comparing the pay-offs of individuals 1 and 3 reveals that 1 3 U > U , if and only if, b -d -(a -c) ) .
This inequality holds for all x if it holds for x = 0. Rewriting yields
As agent 1 is in 3's neighborhood, agent 3 observes 1's pay-off. Also, 3 observes the pay-off of agents 4 and 5, but these pay-offs are lower than his. Hence, individual 3 will switch to cooperation in the next period. Hence, if the above inequality holds, the boundary between the regions of cooperators and the defectors will be between individuals 3 and 4. As the above argument is independent of time, it can be used to prove that in the long run the population consists predominantly of cooperators. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a population in which individuals are matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Part of the interactions between individuals are local and part of them are global. It is shown that for a large class of parameter values and for different kinds of dynamic processes, cooperation will emerge if, and only if, the population size is large enough.
The main principle on which the result is based is that only relative performance matters in evolution and relative performance of defectors becomes poorer when the population size increases (due to a smaller difference in pay-offs out of uniform interaction). It has been shown that this principle holds for different types of imitative behavior.
Proof of Proposition 1
In this case the following is true: if 
Hence, if this condition holds, the D 0 agent at the boundary will switch to cooperation, while the C 0 agent will stick to cooperation. Hence, the boundary between the regions shifts and more agent cooperate. This process continues until either there is no defector left or there is only one D + agent left in the population. This agent will be imitated by its neighbors, but they will switch back to cooperation the next period. Hence, for some T, 
U (C) > U (D).
Hence, nobody will switch to another behavior in period 1 or in any subsequent period. This implies coexistence of the two regions.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
which can be rewritten as
For the rest of the argument, I refer to the proof of Proposition 1 (i).
(ii) In the same way as above: In this case, however, x t+5 = x t+3 -4 and x t+5 is equal to 1 or 2.
